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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the changes which the new standing orders have 
introduced into the legislative process and considers how the legislative 
process will operate within an MMP elected Parliament. The paper's focus 
is on the impact of the new standing orders and MMP on legislative 
scrutiny and quality and on the degree of control which the government 
exercises over the legislative process. The issues of executive control, 
scrutiny and quality control under FPP and earlier standing orders are 
examined to provide a basis for this discussion. The impact of MMP on the 
legislative process is then considered and the new standing orders are 
examined within that context. 
The paper concludes that the impact of MMP on the legislative process 
could be quite profound. Government's will generally have less control 
over the content of legislation and the legislative process than in the past. 
Legislation as a result will again become the function of the Parliament 
which will determine its substantive content and not just endorse and 
legitimise it. The consequences for the scrutiny and quality of legislation 
are somewhat mixed . The new standing orders enhance procedural 
safeguards, but the shift in power from the executive to the Parliament 
will make the passage of legislation protracted and uncertain. As a result 
legislation is less likely to be coherent and of a consistently high quality. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography, 
and annexure) comprises approximately 15,200 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
On October 12 1996 New Zealand will hold its first MMP election. The 
shift to the mixed member proportional representation electoral system 
("MMP") will change the composition of Parliament and this will in turn 
alter the balance of power between the executive and the Parliament. 
Changes which have occurred during the lead up to MMP indicate that 
Parliament will become a more significant institution within the New 
Zealand constitutional framework under MMP. 
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In preparation for the changes which MMP should bring to the 
composition of Parliament the Standing Orders Select Committee ("the 
Review Committee") undertook an extensive review of the standing orders 
of the House of Representatives ("the House"). The new standing orders 
recommended by the Review Committee were adopted by the House on 
19 December 1995. The House began operating under the new standing 
orders on 20 February 1996. The new standing orders bring the internal 
procedures used within the House into line with the reality of a multi-
party Parliament elected under MMP.1 
The new standing orders introduced significant changes to the legislative 
process. These changes reflect a move to proportionality and a 
consequential reduction in government control over the House and its 
legislative function. This paper examines the changes which the new 
standing orders have introduced into the legislative process and considers 
how the legislative process will operate within an MMP elected 
Parliament. The paper's focus is on the impact of the new standing orders 
and MMP on legislative scrutiny and quality and on the degree of control 
which the government exercises over the legislative process. 
1 Report of the Standing Orders Committee on the Review of the Standing Orders, [1995] AJHR 
I.18A, p10. 
The significance of the changes which will result from MMP can only 
really be understood when placed in context. The paper therefore briefly 
sketches the background constitutional principles and considers how 
power was distributed within the New Zealand constitutional framework 
when the first past the post electoral system ("FPP") was in operation. The 
paper examines specifically how under FPP the government was able to 
use its numbers in the House to control the legislative process. 
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The paper then considers the impact of executive control on legislative 
scrutiny and quality control, focusing on the inadequacy of procedural 
safeguards within the standing orders. As a number of commentators have 
already demonstrated the absence of procedural checks, coupled with 
strong executive government with an enormous legislative workload, 
operated in the past to prevent the appropriate scrutiny of legislation. This 
in turn compromised the quality of new legislation. 2 
The impact of MMP on the constitutional framework and on the legislative 
process is then considered and the new standing orders are examined to 
access how the legislative process will operate within an MMP elected 
Parliament. The important question of whether the executive will continue 
to control the legislative process under MMP is explored here. The impact 
of the new standing orders and MMP on legislative scrutiny and quality 
control is then examined. The key issue which is considered here is 
whether the new standing orders will enhance legislative scrutiny and 
quality control. 
The paper concludes that MMP will produce a more diverse range of 
election outcomes than the previous system. In particula~ MMP will 
sometimes result in a minority government or an unstable or diverse 
coalition government which will not command a secure majority within 
2 J F Burrows & P A Joseph, "Parliamentary Law Making", [1990] NZLJ 306, p307. 
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the House on all policy issues. Such a government will not exercise the 
degree of control over the legislative process which New Zealand 
governments have in the past. The impact of MMP on the New Zealand 
system of government could therefore be quite profound. A government 
may not always be able to control the content and passage of legislation 
because it may not always be able to build or maintaining sufficient 
support for any particular legislative proposal. Where a government does 
not command a secure majority within the House the content of legislation 
will be determined by the House, operating particularly through select 
committees, rather than by the government. Legislation as a result will 
again become truly the function of the Parliament which will determine its 
substantive content and not just endorse and legitimise it. 
The consequences in terms of the scrutiny and quality of legislation are 
somewhat mixed. The new standing orders have enhanced the procedural 
safeguards and thereby increased the opportunity for appropriate and full 
scrutiny of legislation by select committees and the House. This should 
generally result in Bills being more fully considered before they become 
law. However as a result of the shift in power from the executive to the 
Parliament, the legislative process itself will become more protracted and 
uncertain. There will be more opportunity for amendment and 
modification to Bills during the process. Private members Bills will also 
increase in number and could become a more significant source of law. 
Where the substantive content of legislation is relatively fluid during the 
legislative process, legislation is less likely to be coherent and of a 
consistently high quality. It may be therefore that improvements in quality, 
which could be expected as the result of increased scrutiny and enhanced 
procedural safeguards under the new standing orders, will be offset by the 
increased uncertainty which will surround the content of legislation during 
its passage through the House. 
II CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
The two background constitutional principles which are relevant for the 
purposes of this paper, are the separation of powers and the principle of 
responsible government. The separation of powers is both a descriptive 
and prescriptive doctrine. 3 As a descriptive statement the separation of 
powers recognises that there are three functions of government; the 
legislative, the executive and the judicial. As a prescriptive statement the 
doctrine states that when these different functions of government are 
undertaken by separate institutions each institution operates as a check on 
the power of the other two.4 
Within the New Zealand constitution the three functions of government 
are respectively preformed by the Parliament, (consisting of the Queen in 
right of the government of New Zealand and the elected House of 
Representatives), the executive government (including the elected 
government), and the judiciary. Under the Westminster model of 
responsible government, which New Zealand subscribes to, ministers who 
form the political executive are drawn from the membership of the 
democratically elected House of Representatives. As a result there is not 
any real separation of power between the executive and the legislative 
branches of government. 
As a matter of constitutional theory the political executive is within the 
control of the House of Representatives. Parliament not only makes the 
laws but it holds the government of the day accountable for its 
management of the apparatus of state. The government must answer to 
Parliament for the administration and day to day management of the 
3 Joseph P A, Constitutional a11d Administrative Law in New Zealand, (The Law Book 
Company, Sydney, 1993) p208. 
4Palmer G, Unbridled Power, (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987) pS. 
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functions of state.5 Under the convention of ministerial responsibility the 
government and its ministers are ultimately accountable to the Parliament 
for all the action of the executive.6 It is a binding convention that a 
government may only remain in office while it has the support of the 
House. The confidence of Parliament is therefore necessary to the 
maintenance of government. 
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A Cabinet Dominance 
However until recently the government in office has in practice effectively 
controlled both the legislative and executive branches of government. 
Power within the New Zealand constitution is firmly held by the Cabinet. 
All Cabinet ministers were until recently drawn from a single political 
party which enjoyed a cohesive majority within the House.7 This meant 
that once decisions were made by Cabinet, the convention of collective 
ministerial responsibility and the strict whipping system ensured that 
those decisions were accepted by the governing party's parliamentary 
caucus and pushed by the caucus through Parliament. Strong party 
discipline, operating within Parliament through the caucus system, has 
long been recognised as an important and distinctive feature of the New 
Zealand system of government.8 
s McGee D, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, (2 ed, GP Publications, Wellington, 1994) 
p4. 
6 See n5, p4. 
1 Earlier this year the National Government entered into a coalition agreement with the 
United NZ party. As a result of that agreement a member of the United NZ Party, Peter 
Dunne, was made a Cabinet minister. For the first time in recent history the Cabinet was 
drawn from more than one political party. 
s See Palmer G, Unbridled Power, (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987); Mulgan 
R, "The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand", in Hyam Gold (ed) New Zealand Politics in 
Perspective, (3 ed, Longman Paul, New Zealand, 1992). 
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The FPP electoral system resulted, until recently, in a Parliament 
dominated by one political party. It has been convincingly argued that the 
single member, simple-plurality electoral system, (by penalising minor 
parties), facilitated the development of a two party Parliament and single 
party government.9 A key feature of the form of Westminster government 
which developed in New Zealand under FPP, was exceptionally strong 
executive government, driven by a Cabinet drawn from the leading 
members of a single political party. The result was an incredible 
concentration of decision making power in the New Zealand Cabinet. 10 
As the final decision maker on all important policy issues, Cabinet decided 
the content of all government legislation which was introduced into the 
House. The control which the governing party exercised within the House 
severely limited the scope for policy change once a government Bill was 
introduced. It is not surprising therefore, that the awesome constitutional 
power of the New Zealand Cabinet under FPP, was widely condemned by 
legal and political commentators as unconstrained tyranny, the so called 
"elected dictatorship". 11 It has been persuasively argued, by commentators 
advocating the imposition of greater controls over executive power, that 
structural change was necessary to restore the balance between the 
executive and the Parliament. 12 
The resulting constitutional reform focused on the FPP electoral system 
which had almost guaranteed the dominance of a single political party 
9 Mulgan R, "The Westminister System and the Erosion of Democratic Legitimacy" in B D 
Gray & RB McClintock (eds) Courts and Policy: Checking the Balance, (Brookers Ltd, 
Wellington, 1995) p268. 
10 See n4, p6. 
11 See n9, p269. 
12 See Palmer G, Unbridled Power, (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987); Mulgan 
R, "The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand", in Hyam Gold (ed) New Zealand Politics in 
Perspective, (3 ed, Longman Paul, New Zealand, 1992). 
within the House. The adoption of MMP will alter the balance of power 
between the executive and the Parliament. Under MMP the strength of 
each party's representation within the House will be determined by the 
proportion of the vote which they receive at an election. It is therefore 
unlikely that any one political party will again win sufficient seats under 
MMP to ensure numerical dominance over the House and its business. 
B Government Control over Legislation 
10 
The executive's dominance over the Parliament resulted in legislation 
becoming a function of the executive rather than the Parliament. Keith 
Jackson claimed that the passage of law through the Parliament served 
only to give law legitimacy. Jackson said: "If legislation remains a central 
preoccupation of parliaments, it is widely recognised today that the 
principle role of the House of Representatives is in endorsing and 
legitimising rather than formulating".13 Sir Geoffrey Palmer took a similar 
view in 1987 when he said that the Cabinet and the government caucus 
essentially thrash out the substantive policy contained in legislation and 
the Parliament "rubber stamps" the outcome of that process. 14 In his view 
Parliament determined nothing of substance since the issues which were 
taken to Parliament had been predetermined within government. 15 
Until recently the government could be confident that, due to its control 
over the procedures of the House and its superior numbers within the 
House, the substantive policy content of any legislative proposal which it 
put forward would not be changed without the government's approval 
13 Jackson K, The Dilemma of Parliament , (Allen and Unwin, Wellington, 1987) p38. 
14 Palmer G, "The NZ Legislative Machine" in M Chen & G Palmer (eds) Public Law in 
New Zealand, ( Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1993) p622. 
1s See n14, p623. 
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during its passage through the House. The government exercised 
considerable control, for the same reasons, over the content of Parliament's 
legislative programme. In theory all Members of Parliament ("MPs") could, 
under the standing orders, put forward Bills. In practice the government 
had near total control over which Bills were debated by Parliament. Within 
the limits set by the standing orders, the order in which the House dealt 
with business, including legislation, was determined by the Leader of the 
House. The government's legislative programme completely dominated the 
Parliament's legislative agenda . 
The government legislative programme, which is put together by the 
Cabinet Legislative Committee, provides the framework within which a 
government developes its legislative priorities and manages the progress of 
legislation through the House.16 The Cabinet Legislative Committee closely 
manages and controls the government legislative programme. It checks all 
government Bills once the policy issues are settled and must approve each 
government Bill before it can be introduced into the House. 
Government bills also must clear the government caucus before 
introduction. According to both Jackson and Palmer candid debate on a 
Bill would in the past take place at the caucus rather than in Parliament 
itself. As a result the tendency was for the government caucus to exercise 
the role of power and influence which was formally associated with the 
floor of the House, leaving the House to play the role of an endorser of 
proposals, something akin to that of an upper chamber.17 
Under FPP the government effectively controlled the legislature. 
Government sponsored legislation completely dominated Parliament's 
legislative programme. The content of legislation was determined by the 
16 Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Office Ma1111al, (The Cabinet Office, Wellington, 1996) 5/ 1. 
17 See n13, p30. 
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Cabinet and to a lesser degree the government caucus. The numerical 
dominance of the government caucus was utilised to ensure that 
government sponsored legislation progressed successfully through the 
House. The government was able to use its numbers and unity within the 
House to control the legislative process. The implications of government 
control on the effective scrutiny of legislation and on quality control within 
the legislative process are discussed next. 
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III LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY AND QUALITY 
CONTROL 
The purpose of the legislative process is to provide checks and balances 
and quality controls on the content of new legislation.18 The standing 
orders determine the legislative process which each Bill goes through 
before passing into law. The various stages of the legislative process form, 
in theory, significant hurdles for a Bill to overcome before becoming law. 
The steps specified in the standing orders are therefore designed to ensure 
proper consideration of all aspects of a Bill before it is passed into law. It 
has been suggested that as an ideal lawmaking should allow time for 
reflection and sober second thought.19 But, as many commentators have 
now pointed out, reality has fallen well short of this ideal. 20 
A Barriers to Effective Scrutiny 
It has been convincingly argued that, prior to the adoption of the new 
standing orders this year, the legislative process contained insufficient 
procedural safeguards to ensure the proper scrutiny of legislation. 21 The 
lack of procedural checks, coupled with strong executive government with 
an enormous legislative workload, operated to prevent the appropriate 
scrutiny of legislation and this in turn compromised the quality of new 
legislation. 22 Palmer has suggested that the balance of power between the 
1s See n14, p618. 
19 See n4, p159. 
20 See n2. 
21 See n2. 
22 See n2, p307. 
/ 
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executive and Parliament is the issue which is most crucial to scrutiny. 
Where the executive is able to completely dominate the House and its 
committees the opportunity to effectively scrutinise legislative proposals is 
compromised.23 As was discussed earlier in the paper the government was 
able under FPP to dominate the House and its committees and was as a 
result able to exercise almost total control over the passage and shape of 
legislation. 24 
Philip Joseph has argued that in the past the rules of parliamentary 
procedures, (the standing orders), operated to actually entrench the 
executive's control of the legislative process by securing the government's 
control over the business of the House.25 The opportunity to effectively 
scrutinise legislation was compromised under earlier standing orders 
because the government was able to use its numbers within the House to 
manipulate the legislative process. It was able to influence both the volume 
of legislation which was considered by the House, and the speed at which 
legislation was processed by the House. The procedural shortcomings 
within the standing orders, which were used on occasion to circumvent the 
effective scrutiny of legislation, have now been clearly identified by a 
number of commentators.26 The main issues which these commentators 
have identified are discussed briefly below. 
23Palmer G, New Zealand's Co11stit11tio11 in Crisis, (John Mclndoe, Dundein, 1992) pl05. 
24See above II B. 
25 See n3, p282. 
26 See for example J F Burrows & PA Joseph, "Parliamentary Law Making", [1990] NZLJ 
306; P Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, (The Law Book 
Company, Sydney, 1993); Palmer G, Unbridled Power, (2 ed, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1987); Palmer G, The New Zealand Constitution in Crisis: Reforming our Political 
System (John Mclndoe, Dunedin, 1992); Palmer G, "The NZ Legislative Machine" in M 
Chen & G Palmer (eds) Public Law in New Zealand, (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
1993). -
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1 The misuse of urgency 
Urgency, which was originally intended as an exceptional measure, 
acquired the semblance of normality under earlier standing orders.27 When 
urgency was taken in relation to a Bill the House proceeded upon and 
continued debating the Bill until all stages had been completed.28 Joseph 
has argued that urgency has been abused as a method for truncating the 
legislative process and thereby avoiding the full scrutiny of the House and 
select committees.29 Many situations have been documented where the use 
of urgency has been nothing less than an abuse of process.30 
Urgency is used by government to speed up the legislative process. In the 
pas~ time and volume pressures have resulted in the taking of urgency on 
a considerable amount of legislation. By taking urgency the government is 
able to push through greater volumes of legislation. The risk however is 
that this may leave insufficient time for proper consideration and reflection 
on the content of Bills. The other effect of urgency, which can be of 
assistance to the government, is its impact on the agenda of Parliament. 
According to Palmer the government can, by taking urgency, determine 
that the business of the House is dealt with in a certain order. 31 
The new standing orders place some important constraints on the use and 
27 See n2, p306. 
28 Standing Orders of the New Zealand House of Representatives (New Zealand House of 
Representatives, Wellington, 1992), S052. 
29 See n3, p283. 
30 For example in 1991 several pieces of legislation were carried through as part of the 
budget debate and were therefore passed under urgency when there was no substantive 
case for urgency. This case is documented: Palmer G, The New Zealand Constitution in 
Crisis: Reforming our Political System (John Mclndoe, Dunedin, 1992) p120. 
31 See n23, p120. 
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effects of urgency. These restraints which reduce the value of urgency to a 
government will be discussed later in the paper. 32 
2 The effectiveness of select committee scrutiny 
It has been claimed by Palmer that the most important aspects of scrutiny 
take place during select committee. He suggests that select committees are 
far more potent engines of scrutiny than the proceedings of the debating 
chamber.33 The effective operation of select committees is therefore 
essential to legislative scrutiny. Despite the significance of scrutiny by 
select committee, sufficient time has not always been made available for 
this important stage of the process. The select committee stage is the one 
stage in the process where interested parties outside the government and 
Parliament have a formal opportunity to influence the form and content of 
legislation. Submissions from the public and interest groups can bring 
forward information which is not known to government. Submissions can 
result in Bills being substantially changed at select committee.34 
Appropriate and adequate public consultation and consideration of Bills at 
select committee takes valuable times and slows the legislative process 
down considerably. Allowing adequate time for select committee 
consultation can sometimes conflict with the government's political desire 
to get legislation through the House quickly. The sheer volume of 
legislation which was considered by select committees in the past further 
compounded the time pressure. As a result select committees have not 
always had time for adequate consideration of a proposal. There are 
numerous examples of unrealistic time frames being imposed on select 
32 See below V A 6. 
33 See n23, p122. 
34 See n3, p290. 
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committees for the hearing and consideration of public submissions.35 
Another and more fundamental issue which has undermined the 
effectiveness of select committees has been the dominance of select 
committees by the government caucus. Under previous standing orders 
select committee composition reflected the executive's dominance of the 
House. Select committees were chaired by the government which always, 
until recently, had a majority of members on each committee. The result 
was that select committee recommendations were largely controlled by the 
government caucus. Select committee reports tended to mirror the 
government view rather than reflect the outcome of the committee's 
hearings. 36 
According to Hon David Caygill, government members, who were usually 
in the majority on each committee, would form their views at caucus 
rather than at the select committee.37 So although it has become the 
practice in recent years for select committees to conduct major surgery on 
Bills in light of the submissions received, 38 this tended to reflect a 
government policy shift rather than the truly independent deliberations of 
the committee itself. 
The changes which the new standing orders introduce to the membership 
of select committees will make it more difficult for the government to 
dominate select committees. Time and volume pressures on select 
3s See n2. 
36 For example the Hon Winston Peters has said: "I have never been able to understand 
how it is that a select committee would sit, hear the submissions and all the evidence 
from around New Zealand and from experts, and then go off and ask the caucus what it 
thinks - members who have never heard any of the evidence - and then put what the 
caucus thinks in the report", (1995) 54 NZPD 10826. 
37 Caygill D, "Functions and Powers of Parliamentary Committees: A New Zealand 
Perspective" in M Chen & G Palmer (eds) Public Law in New Zealand, (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1993) p669. 
38 See n14, p622. 
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committees should also be reduced. These issues are discussed later in the 
paper. 39 
3 Committee of the whole House and amendments 
There is less agreement between commentators on whether previous 
standing orders compromised scrutiny by allowing undue speed during 
the Committee of the whole House stage of the legislative process. Under 
the previous standing orders the House could debate a Bill part by part 
rather than clause by clause. Joseph and Burrows have claimed that there 
have been examples of governments adding parts into Bills so they could 
sped the legislative process up in this way. This they claim was an abuse 
of process.40 Palmer however presents a compelling counter argument. He 
claims that debate within the House is essentially political in nature and 
designed to delay and expose the policy of a Bill rather than to improve or 
stop the Bill. As such there was little real concern, despite the rhetoric, 
with the detail of the clauses within a Bill and it was unlikely that the 
provisions would be examined in detail in any bone fide way. 41 
If Palmer's argument about the nature of debate in the House is accepted, 
then the incorporation of major amendments in the form of Supplementary 
Order Papers ("S0Ps") at the Committee of the whole House stage, 
imposes a serious obstacle to effective legislative scrutiny. SOPs, which 
were originally intended as a method for amending errors, have been used 
to make substantive changes to Bills at the last minute. SOPs which are 
prepared after the select committee stage are considered for the first time 
at the Committee of the whole House stage. The issues contained in such 
SOPs have not gone through either a first or second reading, and have not 
39 See below V C 4. 
40 See n2, p307. 
41 See n23, p123. 
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been exposed to public submission at select committee. Sometimes 
substantive changes are included in SOPs. In such cases not only has the 
detail not been scrutinised, but the policy itself has not been examined. 
Where substantial policy changes are made by SOP without reference to a 
select committee the role of the select committee in scrutinising the Bill is 
also considerably undermined.42 
The Review Committee considered that SOPs are an essential tool for 
correcting matters of detail and addressing issues which come up at the 
last minute. The practice of using SOPs to introduce substantive 
amendments circumvented most of the procedural safeguards within the 
legislative process and needed to stop. Their recommendations on this 
issue will be discussed later in the paper.43 
4 Law Refonn Bills 
A new type of Omnibus Bill appeared in the early 1980s. The Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill lumped together a large number of 
miscellaneous and unconnected reforms and dealt with them in one Bill . 
The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill enacted in 1989 for 
example amended 55 Acts. Joseph has claimed that some of the 
amendments in the 1989 Bill were substantial reforms.44 Palmer however 
suggests that criticism of Omnibus Bills needs to be balanced against their 
value as a mechanism for getting relatively non contentious law reform, 
which would not otherwise be undertaken, on the government's busy 
legislative agenda .45 Further Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bills 
42 J F Burrows & PA Joseph, "Parliamentary Law Making", [1990] NZLJ 306, p307. 
43 See below V A 4. 
44 See n3, p295. 
45 See n 23, p121. 
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are broken up when considered at Select Committee.46 While both points 
are obviously correct and provide a general justification for Omnibus Bills, 
their use and misuse could be better controlled without compromising 
their legitimate value. The new standing orders impose tighter controls on 
Omnibus Bills. These improvements will be considered later in the paper. 47 
B Quality Control Standards 
A key purpose of legislative scrutiny is quality control. The legislative 
process should operate to ensure that legislation is effective and technically 
sound and fits harmoniously into the fabric of existing laws. 48 Quality 
control standards within the system are designed to ensure that legislation 
consistently conforms to an appropriate technical standard. Quality control 
frameworks have been developed by both the Legislation Advisory 
Committee and the Law Commission. These frameworks are outlined 
briefly below and the extent to which the legislative process ensures that 
legislation complies with these standards is examined. 
1 Setting the standard 
The Legislation Advisory Committee developed and released guidelines 
for improving the quality of legislation in 1986.49 These guidelines, which 
46 See n23, p121. 
47 See below V A 7. 
48 New Zealand Law Commission, Legislation Manual Structure and Style - Report 35, 
(Wellington, 1996) pl. 
49 Legislation Advisory Committee, Legislative Change: Guidelines on Process and Content, 
(Department of Justice, Wellington, 1987). A revised edition was released as Legislation 
Advisory Committee, Legislative Change: Guidelines on Process and Content, ( 2 ed, 
Department of Justice, Wellington, 1991). 
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have been adopted by successive governments50 and are accepted and used 
by the House, contain a number of principles which establish a useful 
framework for ensuring that legislation conforms to an appropriate 
standard. 
The principles which the Legislation Advisory Committee have established 
are as follows: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
policy development and drafting are informed by the necessary 
technical expertise; 
draft legislation incorporates the policy objectives of its proponent; 
draft legislation is clear and understandable; 
adequate consultation takes place during the development of draft 
legislation and following its introduction; 
• the draft legislation fits within the general area of law to which it 
relates; 
• the draft legislation complies with the basic legal principles which 
form the foundation of New Zealand's legal and constitutional 
system; 
• the draft legislation complies with the Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
These principles are relevant for all stages of the legislative process and 
they apply equally to amendments to Bills which are put forward at any 
so The guidelines have been accepted by successive governments and are endorsed in the 
Cabinet Office Manual as government policy. See: Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Office 
Manual (The Cabinet Office, Wellington 1994) Chapter 5/2. 
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stage of the legislative process. 
The Law Commission recently issued a legislation manual on the style and 
structure of legislation. 51 The Commission has recommended the manual to 
government as a means of providing rules and guidelines for the drafting 
of understandable and accessible legislation. The Law Commission 
provides a similar framework for assessing legislative quality as the 
Legislation Advisory Committee. The Commission states that if new laws 
are to gain broad public acceptance and enhance the quality of the statute 
book, they must: 
• be developed through an established and adequate process, one 
that encourages positive and effective participation; 
• comply with the legal principles on which our society is based: the 
rule of law, fairness, individual liberty, protection of personal and 
property rights; 
• be effective and technically sound and fit harmoniously into the 
fabric of existing laws, and; 
• be accessible and understandable. 52 
2 Complying with the standard 
To match the standard identified by both the Law Commission and the 
Legislation Advisory Council each stage of the legislative process must be 
informed by high quality legal advice. Quality legal advice is needed 
during the development stage to ensure correct instrument choice and 
51 Seen 48. 
52 See n 48, pl. 
legislative design. Appropriate legal advice to needed on how the 
legislative proposal fits into the general area of law to which it relates. 
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Competent legal advice is needed on whether the legislative proposal 
complies with the basic and underlying principles of the legal system and 
the Constitution. The Legislation Advisory Committee has identified these 
basic principles as those which have been established by the courts, 
Parliament, the rule of law, democratic principles, the Treaty of Waitangi, 
and natural justice.53 The Law Commission has identified fairness, 
individual liberty and the protection of personal and property rights as 
basic and underlying principles of the legal system.54 The Parliament as 
sovereign law maker can modify any one of these principles, but should 
do so with full knowledge and clear intention. Similarly legal advice is 
needed on whether a proposed Bill complies with the Bill of Rights Act 
1990 and with New Zealand's international law obligations. 
High quality drafting is needed to meet and maintain the standard 
identified by the Legislation Advisory Committee and the Law 
Commission. Expertise in drafting is necessary to develop the most 
effective representation of a policy in Bill form. A critical question 
identified by the Legislation Advisory Committee is whether draft 
legislation incorporates the objectives of its proponents. Another drafting 
issue which has been raised is ensuring that legislation is as accessible and 
understandable as the content permits. The Law Commission advocates 
the use of plain language drafting to improve the accessibility and clarity 
of legislation. 55 
53 Legislation Advisory Committee, Legislative Change: Guidelines on Process and Content, 
(2 ed, Department of Justice, Wellington, 1991). 
54 See n 48, pl. 
55 See n 48, p33. 
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The extent to which draft legislation is informed by good quality legal 
advice can vary. All government Bills are sponsored by a minister and are 
developed for the minister by a government department. Ministers and 
departments initiating legislation are responsible for ensuring that draft 
legislation reflects government poticy. 56 Departments are required to 
consider the issue of compliance with the Treaty of Waitangi and with the 
Bill of Rights Act 1990. Ministers are also required to draw attention to any 
aspects of a legislative proposal which has implications for either the Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 or the Treaty of Waitangi.57 
Government Bills flowing out of the government's policy development 
process have, at least in theory, been informed by the appropriate technical 
expertise and skill, including legal advice. If the policy development 
process always worked effectively then it could be assumed that all 
government Bills were informed by competent legal advice. Reality does 
not always correspond to this ideal. Political considerations can impact 
adversely on the development of sound legislation by departments. 
Ministers may for example impose unrealistic and sometimes unnecessary 
deadlines that result in rushed and superficial policy analysis. 58 
Time and resource pressures also create problems for legislative drafting. 
All government Bills and government sponsored amendments are drafted 
under the supervision of the Parliamentary Counsel Office.59 Parliamentary 
Counsel attend some stages of the select committee process for the 
56 See n16, Chapter 5/1 AS. 
s7 See n 16, Chapter 5/1 A6. 
sa M Probine, "The potential impact of MMP on the quality of Legislation" in Public Sector, 
Vol 17, No 1, p8. 
s9 Under The Statutes Drafting and Compilation Act 1920 the Parliamentary Counsel Office is 
required to draft all government Bills and amendments. Under The Statutes Drafting and 
Compilation Amendment Act 1995 provision is made for the external drafting of taxation 
legislation. 
purpose of advising on and drafting amendments. 60 Drafting quality will 
be compromised whenever time pressures intervene so that the drafting 
resources of the Parliamentary Counsel office are stretched too thinly. 
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The Parliamentary Counsel office works under considerable pressure 
against a constant back log of drafting requests and delay. 61 Political 
pressures can also result in Bills being introduced into the House before 
the drafting process has been completed. When this occurs the later stages 
of the legislative process are heavily relied on to improve the drafting 
quality of the Bill. A number of Bills have had to be rewritten at the select 
committee stage increasing the pressure on time and resources. 62 Speed 
and haste increases the risk that technical flaws will be missed or that 
wider legislative implications will be overlooked. Substantive change 
during the later stages of the legislative process reduce the opportunity for 
adequate scrutiny and potentially compromise the quality of legislation. 
Private member's Bills and amendments do not always conform to the 
appropriate technical standard. Private member's Bills have increased in 
number over recent years to become an additional, although very minor, 
source of law. Despite their increased significance, no specialist legal 
drafting or advice services are provided for Bills or amendments. Members 
either obtain assistance from the Office of the Clerk of the House, their 
parties, or draft Bills and amendments themselves. The results in terms of 
technical quality are mixed. The issue of drafting and advice for this 
purpose was considered by the Review Committee and will be discussed 
later in the paper. 63 
ro W Iles "New Zealand Experience of Scrutiny of Parliamentary Legislation" in M Chen & 
G Palmer (eds) Public Law in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1993) p665. 
61 See n14, p623. 
62 See n60, p665. 
63 See below V C 5. 
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According to Palmer legislative quality is determined predominately by 
the policy development process and the technical quality of the drafting. 
Improvements in quality will be found predominately through slowing the 
legislative process down. 64 The legislative process is however driven by 
political priorities65 so there will always be time and volume pressures 
within the system. As shall be discussed later in the paper l\1MP is likely 
to produce political changes which may slow the legislative process down 
and reduce the volume of legislation in the system.66 Such a change could 
considerably reduce the pressure on legislative drafting. 
The Legislation Advisory Committee and the Law Commission both 
identify consultation as relevant to legislative quality. Undertaking 
appropriate consultation during the development of the legislative 
proposal and following its introduction can improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of legislation. 67 Consultation within government is necessary 
to ensure that a range of perspectives are considered. Problems can then 
be identified at an early stage and a coherent policy proposal can be put 
forward for drafting. 68 Early consultation and identification of problems 
reduces the need for amendment and rewriting during the select 
committee stage of the legislative process. 
Political considerations have however impacted adversely on consultation 
during the developmental stage of a Bill. The adversarial nature of the 
political system has inhibited consultation with community and interest 
64 See n14, p624. 
65 See n14, p624. 
66 See below IV B. 
67 See n53. 
68 See n 16, Chapter 5/ 1. 
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groups at the policy developmei-lt and analysis stage.69 The Cabinet Office 
Manual specifically reminds departments that: "at every stage of its 
development, draft legislation is confidential and should not be disclosed 
to individuals or organisations outside Government other than by the 
minister concerned, or with his or her prior approval". 70 The opportunity 
for early consultation is therefore somewhat restricted. 
The importance of select committee consultation has already been 
considered. As discussed earlier in the paper select committee consultation 
may raise issues which had not previously been considered. 71 Where 
legislation is not adequately scrutinised at select committee because of time 
and volume pressures flaws and omissions may not be detected and the 
quality may be compromised. 
69 See n58, p8. 
,o See n16, Chapter 5/1 A18. 
71See above m A 2. 
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IV THE IMP ACT OF MMP 
Although MMP will only directly change the way that New Zealand elects 
its MPs and not the fundamental institutions of the New Zealand 
Constitution it will indirectly alter the way those institutions operate.72 The 
change to the composition of Parliament which is likely to result from 
MMP will change the balance of power between the executive and the 
Parliament. 
Changes in the relationship between the executive and Parliament will 
alter how the legislative process operates. The operation of the legislative 
process under the new standing orders will depend on the form, strength 
and stability of the government in power after each election. In order to 
provide a context for the later discussion of the new standing orders, it is 
worth considering the changes which MMP is likely to introduce into the 
relationship between the executive and Parliament, and the impact of these 
changes on the legislative process,. 
A The Fann of Government 
The four forms which government can logically take under MMP, are in 
descending order of strength: a single party majority; a coalition majority; 
a single party minority; and a coalition minority. A single party majority 
government would be assured of majority support for any Bill which has 
the full support of MPs who belong to the governing party. A majority 
coalition government could be confident of support for those legislative 
proposals which fall within the ambit of matters outlined in the coalition 
n Palmer, The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey, "The likely consequences of MMP on the System of 
Government", Proceedings of an IPA Seminar held at Downstage Theatre Wellington, 5 
October 1995, p3. 
agreement. Outside this a majodty coalition government would need to 
build an internal consensus before proceeding with any proposal. 
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Both forms of minority government are inherently weaker. A single party 
minority government will need to build support within the House around 
each legislative proposal which it wishes to enact. A coalition minority 
government will need to build internal consensus and support for each 
proposal and then sufficient external support from parties outside the 
coalition before introducing a Bill into the House. 
Since the referendum in 1993 adopting MMP the New Zealand 
Government and Parliament have been in a state of transition between FPP 
and MMP. A number of new political parties and alliances have been 
formed within the New Zealand Parliament. This has resulted in the 
National Government elected in 1993 changing from a single party 
majority government, with a majority of one, to a single party minority 
government for a period. As a minority government the National 
Government had to build support around its legislative proposals. 73 One 
result was a substantial reduction in the volume of legislation which the 
Government put before the House. More recently the National Party has 
formed a coalition with the United NZ Party and has now become a 
majority coalition government. 
As was discussed earlier in the paper New Zealand has in the past had 
single party majority government.74 Under FPP a single party has held an 
outright majority of seats in the House and has as a result had the 
numbers necessary to control the House and its committees. This was 
because FPP as a single member, simple-plurality electoral system 
73 For example this was the approach taken over the Tax Reform and Social Policy Bill 
introduced in June 1996. 
74 See above TI A. 
30 
penalised minor parties and facilitated the domination of Parliament by a 
single party government.75 It is very unlikely that New Zealand will 
continue to experience single party majority government under MMP. 
Coalition and minority governments are far more probable under MMP.76 
This is because a single party would need to win close to 50% of the vote 
in a general election to obtain over 50% of the seats in the House to form a 
single party majority government. This has not happened very often in 
New Zealand's history and there is no reason to believe it will happen 
under MMP. 
The move to MMP will therefore change the form that government will 
take. This will have a significant effect on the balance of power between 
the government and the Parliament. There will be something of a shift in 
power from the executive to the legislature. The government, whether a 
minority or coalition, may not have majority support on every policy issue 
which comes before the House. The Prime Minister the Right Hon Jim 
Bolger, when speaking recently at a conference on MMP, said that 
governments can not in future expect to have full control over Parliament's 
legislative programme and must learn to live with defeats on legislation in 
the House77 . 
This change has already begun to manifest itself in the transition to MMP. 
On 21 August 1996 an opposition Private members Bill introducing 
compulsory teacher registration was passed with the support of the 
Government coalition partner the United NZ Party. The Government 
opposed the Bill but without United's support it lacked the numbers to 
75 See n9, p269. 
76 The State Services Commission, Working Under Proportional Representation: A reference for 
the Public Service, (State Services Commission, Wellington, 1995), p21. 
n Opening speech to the Conference on the Constitutional Implications of MMP, held in 
the Legislative Chamber Parliament Buildings 24 May 1996. 
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stop the Bill so was defeated in the House on this policy issue. 78 
The shift in power which will occur under MMP should not however be 
exaggerated. The pattern in almost all western democracies is for the 
executive to have a considerable level of dominance over the business of 
Parliament. 79 This is particularly so when there are reasonably stable 
coalitions with clear agreements and high levels of party discipline. Under 
a closely aligned well structured majority coalition Parliament would 
function much as it has under single party majority government. 
Cabinet government is also a feature of almost all western democracies so 
the continuation of a central role for the Cabinet within the system of 
government must be assumed. Cabinet is essentially a creature of 
convention, with few legal rules binding it into any particular process. It 
has and can continue to evolve and change in order to adapt to the needs 
of a particular government or a particular situation.80 The role and 
functioning of the Cabinet is likely to be modified by MMP and its nature 
and operation may change. It is likely that the role and function of the 
Cabinet will differ between minority and coalition governments. Coalitions 
will emphasis managing relationships within Cabinet while minority 
governments will emphasis managing relationships outside Cabinet. 
B Enacting Legislation 
Under coalition government mechanisms to ensure consultation and 
coordination within the government could become more important and 
78 "Nats lose as teacher register bill passed", The Dominion, Wel1ington. New Zealand, 22 
August 1996, p3. 
79 See n76, p23. 
so See n76, p20. 
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may be developed further. 81 Coalition partners will need to agree on the 
rules for conducting Cabinet business and also dealing with disagreements 
or controversial issues. In terms of the legislative process the focus within 
coalitions will be on reaching agreement within government and settling 
the government's legislative programme. Potential legislative proposals put 
up by ministers which do not have the support of all the coalition partners 
will not be included in the government legislative programme. 
Under minority government the emphasis will be on managing 
relationships outside the government, particularly those with other 
political parties. In times of minority government the procedures for 
consultation with party caucuses are likely to be more significant.82 
Consultation with parties outside the government would probably, as a 
minimum became an informal prerequisite to Cabinet decisions on its 
legislative programme. 
Coalition governments will only introduce in the House as government 
Bills legislative proposals which fall within the ambit of the Coalition's 
agreed legislative programme. As a result a Coalition government's 
legislative programme may consist of considerably less legislation than 
single majority party governments have presented in the past. However 
any Bill which has the support of a majority coalition should be assured of 
majority support within the House once introduced and would be unlikely 
to face defeat in the House. 
Minority governments are much more likely than coalition governments to 
face the prospect of defeat in the House on their legislative proposals. For 
this reason minority governments are unlikely to put forward ambitious 
legislative programmes either. It will also be more likely that government 
81 See n76, p18. 
82 See n76, p 18. 
Bills put forward by a minority government which does not have control 
of the House will undergo substantive modification during their passage 
through the House. 
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The opportunities for changing the substantive policy content of legislation 
during its passage through the House are considerably enhanced where 
the proponent of the legislation does not command a clear majority of 
support. Even where support has been build up prior to the introduction 
of a Bill there will still be greater uncertainty when that support comes 
from outside a party or a coalition and is therefore subject to other 
influences. As a result the legislative process will be protracted and the 
outcome quite uncertain.83 The executive will have diminished autonomy 
in defining which policy initiatives will become law.84 The need for 
building up support for each Bill will also slow the legislative process 
down. 
83 Chen M "Remedying New Zealand's Constitutional Crisis: ls MMP part of the answer?" 
[1990] NZLJ 22, p 28. 
84 Adrian Shields, " Challenges of Change for the Public Service: Issues of Accountability 
and Responsibility in the lead up to MMP", Unpublished LLM Research paper, (Victoria 
University, Wellington, 1995) p45. 
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V THE NEW ST ANDING ORDERS 
In December 1995 the Review Committee presented its report on the 
standing orders to the House. The Review Committee had undertaken a 
comprehensive and complete review of the standing orders to ensure that 
the workings and procedures of the House and its committees were 
consistent with the reality of a multi-party Parliament elected under MMP. 
The review resulted in extensive changes to the standing orders. The new 
standing orders were adopted by the House, with some very minor 
amendments, and came into force on 20 February 1996. 
One of the major issues which the Review Committee focused on was the 
operation of the legislative process in light of the likely changes MMP 
would bring to the composition of the House. Significant changes to the 
legislative process were recommended by the Review Committee. The new 
standing orders generally enhance both the transparency and the flexibility 
of the legislative process. Although, as will be discussed below the 
increased flexibility introduced via the creation and powers of the Business 
Committee could operate to impede transparency.85 The new rules also 
introduce proportionality into the procedures of Parliament and provide 
the basis for a more cooperative approach within the House. 
A Transparency 
The new standing orders contain a number of procedural improvements 
which will generally enhance the transparency of the legislative process. 
Transparency within government is now a well established principle. It 
provides the basis for much of the accountability of ministers and their 
officials. Transparency within the legislative process requires access to 
85 See below VB 1. 
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information and the opportunity for informed debate and participation in 
law making. Many of the changes introduced by the new standing orders 
are designed to ensure that members of the House do not debate or vote 
on legislation before they have had an opportunity to fully consider its 
consequences. Enhancing transparency greatly increases the opportunity 
for effective scrutiny of legislation which also has positive implication for 
the quality of legislation. The areas in which transparency are enhanced 
are examined below. 
1 The first reading 
Under the new standing orders there is no longer a first reading debate 
and no vote on the introduction of a Bill. The Review Committee 
recommended the complete abolition of the first reading debate because 
the debate often took place before members of the House, particularly non 
government members, had had time to develop any real understanding of 
the content of the Bill under consideration.86 Under the previous standing 
orders the first reading debate had been little more than a political 
exchange over a controversial Bill or a technical questions and answer 
session on the content of a non controversial Bill .87 
Under the new standing orders the first time a Bill will be debated will be 
the second reading which will not take place until the third sitting day 
after a Bill has been introduced. This timetabling will ensure that the 
House has an opportunity to consider any Bill before it is debated so that 
the government will not be able to take the House by stealth. 
As a consequence of the abolition of the first reading debate, all Bills 
introduced will automatically pass their first reading. This change is not 
86 See nl, plO. 
87 See n5, p 257. 
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particularly significant for government Bills which invariably passed their 
first reading anyway. The change is significant for private members Bills, 
now called members Bills, which previously would only proceed with 
government support. The impact of the new standing orders on members 
Bills will be discussed in more detail later in the paper.88 
Under the new standing orders information on the policy and intent of 
legislation will be made more explicit. The Committee's report advocated 
the inclusion of a policy statement within the explanatory notes which 
accompanied the introductory copy of a Bill. 89 The policy explanation 
should explain the intentions behind the introduction of the Bill and set 
out in detail precisely what the Bill is intended to achieve. It will thus 
serve much the same function as the proponent's introductory speech of 
the past. 
The inclusion of policy statements should assist the process of quality 
control. Where the intent of legislation is explicitly stated it will be much 
easier to ensure that the intention is captured within the draft Bill. It will 
be easier to see whether the statement and the legislative expression of it 
actually match. The Legislation Advisory Committee identified in the 
guidelines discussed earlier,90 the importance of ensuring that the wording 
of a Bill encapsulates the policy objectives of its proponent. Mai Chen has 
suggested that policy explanations may not only be helpful in elucidating 
the meaning of legislative provisions for the law-makers themselves, but 
may also be helpful for the purposes of statutory interpretation in the 
Courts.91 
88 See below V C 5. 
89 See n1, p54. 
90 See above Ill B 2. 
91 Chen M, "Parliament and Law-Making Under MMP: The New Standing Orders", paper 
of the NZ Law Society Conference in Dunedin, April 1996, p136. 
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It should be noted that the Review Committee's recommendation 
concerning policy explanations, although strongly stated, was not formally 
incorporated into the text of the standing orders. The recommendation has 
been adopted by the Government and all government Bills introduced 
since 20 February 1996 have contained a policy explanation which 
complies with the review Committee's recommendation.92 The Cabinet 
Office Manual was updated recently and now provides instruction to 
government departments on preparation of policy explanations.93 
2 The second reading debate 
Under the new standing orders the second reading debate, which is the 
debate on the principles of a Bill, will now be the first debate on a Bill. The 
second reading has been described as the most important stage through 
which a Bill passes because "its whole principle is then at issue and is 
affirmed or denied by a vote of the House".9-i In passing a Bill at the 
second reading the House essentially commits itself to the policy or 
principles within the Bill. 
Two changes which have been made to the second reading debate, are its 
place in the legislative sequence and the imposition of a two hour time 
limit on the debate. The time limit will apply unless the Business 
Committee reaches an alternative agreement. The new standing orders 
impose time limits on most stages of the legislative process. The 
significance of these time limits95 and the role of the Business Committee96 
92 For an example of a policy statement see the Introductory Copy of The Tax Reform and 
Social Policy Bill. 
93 Cabinet Office, 77ze Cabinet Office Manual, (The Cabinet Office, Wellington, 1996), p57. 
94See n 4, p624. 
95 See below V A 5. 
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are discussed later in the paper. 
The second reading now takes place before a Bill is referred to select 
committee. The Review Committee recommended this change in sequence 
to increase the effectiveness of select committees. This change in 
sequencing will improve select committee scrutiny because the prior 
debate within the House on the principles of a Bill will provide the select 
committee, and those intending to make submissions, with "an 
understanding of the mind of the House" 97 and will highlight the 
controversial issues on which the select committee and public submissions 
should focus. Select committee resources and time will be conserved for 
Bills which are most likely to become law. Where the House does not 
support the principles contained in a Bill it will now be discharged before 
select committee. Scheduling the second reading debate before select 
committee will mean that the political parties represented in the House 
will need to determine their stance on all Bills prior to the first debate 
instead of waiting until each Bill returns from select committee. 
3 Select committee consideration 
Select committees will continue to consider all Bills, ( except Appropriation 
and Imprest Supply Bills), which are not accorded urgency. Select 
committee reports, when completed, will not be set down for debate until 
at least two days after they have been tabled. In the past reports became 
debatable immediately and without notice . The result was that MPs who 
were not on the particular select committee which had examined the Bill, 
had very little opportunity to personally consider the report and 
recommended amendments prior to their debate.98 In fact MPs didn't 
96 See below V B 1. 
97See nl, p54. 
98See nl, p55. 
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always know what amendments had been recommended. By allowing two 
days between the tabling of the select committee report and any debate on 
that report the opportunity for input is greatly increased. The reprinted Bill 
and the report itself will be available to MPs and the public before the 
report is debated. 
Changes have been made which result in more comprehensive reports 
from select committees. Reports now must include a narrative explaining 
any proposed amendments which are put forward. Many reports in the 
past consisted of no more than an amended Bill and an oral report from 
the chairperson of the committee. The written report usually consisted only 
of the amendments which the select committee recommended. Any 
explanation for the recommended amendments or discussion on the 
principles of the Bill was given verbally by the chairperson in the House. 
The opportunity for MPs who had not been involved in the select 
committee to participate in the debate was quite restricted as a result . 
Under the new rules as adopted by the House on 19 December 1995 select 
committees were required to report back with their recommendations on 
all Bills within six months of the referral. However, following a minor 
amendment which was adopted by the House on 22 August 1996, this rule 
has now been modified to allow the Business Committee to extend the 
report back time on government Bills.99 
If a select committee fails to comply with the specified time limit on a Bill 
then, the Bill will automatically be discharged from the committee and set 
down for its next stage. This report back requirement will preclude the 
practice of sending Bills to select committee to be buried. It was in the past 
99 The Review Committee, following its monitoring of the new standing orders during 1996, 
issued a further brief report. This minor amendment was among those proposed by the 
Review Committee in that report. See The Report of the Standing Orders Committee on the 
Review of the Operation of the Standing Orders [1996] AJHR l.18B, p 18. 
40 
a reasonably common tactic for the government to support a member's Bill 
through its first reading for political reasons and then bury the Bill and the 
issue along with it at the select committee. With no set time frame the 
government could use its superior numbers and control over select 
committees to ensure that Bills, which it preferred not to consider further, 
remained before the select committee almost indefinitely. 
The new standing orders do not directly address concerns over the 
adequacy of select committee consultation. As discussed earlier both the 
Legislation Advisory Committee and the Law Commission have identified 
select committee consultation and scrutiny as an important check on the 
quality of legislation. 100 Unrealistic time constraints have in the past 
undermined the ability of select committees to undertake effective 
consultation and scrutiny. 101 Although the new Standing Orders do not 
directly address this issue by, for example including minimum time limits 
for public submissions as some commentators have recommended 102, 
scheduling select committee consideration later in the process should result 
in less legislation actually reaching select committee. 
As discussed in the previous section of the paper there is also likely to be 
less legislation on the government's legislative programme under MMP. 
These changes will increase the amount of time available for the 
consideration of each Bill. The standing orders therefore do indirectly 
improve the opportunity for scrutiny at select committees. Important 
changes to select committee composition, which will also impact on 
scrutiny will be discussed later in the paper. 103 
100 See above IV B 2. 
101See n2. 
102 For example: Palmer G "The NZ Legislative Machine" in M Chen & G Palmer (eds) 
Public Law in New Zealand, (Oxford University Press, Auck.land, 1993). 
103 See below V C 4. 
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4 Amendment by SOPs 
The effectiveness of select committee consultation and scrutiny has in the 
past been undermined by the improper use of SOPs which make 
significant amendment to a Bill during the Committee of the whole House 
stage. This problem was discussed earlier in the paper. 104 Legislative 
scrutiny is undermined particularly where the policy matters contained in 
an SOP have not been considered by a select committee or the House 
before.105 
The Review Committee took the firm view that this practice should stop. 
The approach which they outlined but did not actually incorporate into the 
new rules, is that only amendments which have the general support of the 
House because of their importance, or are of a technical or drafting nature, 
should be permitted at the Committee stage without prior select committee 
study. The Review Committee recommended that government SOPs which 
fell outside the scope of the original Bill, or proposed material changes to 
the Bill, should be referred to a select committee and full public hearings 
should be held if time was available. If time was not available then the 
select committee should hold limited public hearings or at the very least 
be fully briefed on the changes by officials. 106 
These recommendation have not been included in the standing orders so it 
is at this stage uncertain whether or not the recommended practice will be 
followed . The inability of the Review Committee to deal effectively with 
the abuse of SOPs is not surprising as restricting SOPs is a complex 
problem. The issue has been considered in earlier standing orders reviews 
104 See above III A 3. 
105 See nl, p55. 
106 See nl, p56. 
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and has been the subject of considerable submissions. 107 Essentially the 
problem is drafting a standing order which would limit SOPs to technical 
issues only. No standing orders committee has yet felt confident enough to 
define what is a technical change as opposed to a substantive change. 
5 Notice of debate 
As will be clear from the above discussion the new standing orders 
include provisions which require advance notice to be given during the 
various stages of the legislative process. Members will now get notice as to 
when Bills will be debated . Time limits have been imposed on when Bills 
can be set down for debate at each stage. This change is clearly designed 
to make the process more transparent and to enhance the opportunity for 
scrutiny. It will also reduce the executive's ability to take the House by 
surprise and to push a matter through without Opposition MPs finding 
out about it or having a chance to consider it. 108 
6 Misuse of Urgency 
In the past, time and volume pressures have resulted in the regular taking 
of urgency on various stages of a considerable amount of legislation.109 As 
discussed earlier urgency has been abused as a method for truncating the 
legislative process and thereby avoiding the full scrutiny of the House and 
the select committee system. 11 0 Recognising this problem, the Review 
Committee has placed some constraints on the use of urgency. Under the 
new standing orders the government can continue to move for urgency on 
107See Report of the Standing Orders Committee 0 11 the Revierv of the Operatio11 of the Standing 
Orders, [1992] AJHR I.1 8B, p15. 
108 Seen 91 , p133. 
109 See n2. 
uo See n3, p283; and see above III A 1. 
a Bill at any stage but where urgency is taken it will not commence until 
the day following the day on which the motion for urgency was 
accepted .111 
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This change will preclude the enactment of a Bill within a single sitting of 
the House which is an obvious improvement. The provisions for 
extraordinary urgency remain and under these there is no similar 
constraint. However to take extraordinary urgency the House must already 
be sitting under urgency and the Speaker must be satisfied that the move 
is justified. These changes substantially reduce the value of urgency. This 
should address the worst excesses which were identified earlier in the 
paper.112 
7 Omnibus Bills 
The Review Committee proposed tighter controls on the use of Omnibus 
Bills for other than technical or non controversial amendments. 113 
Omnibus Bills have been criticised for unduly truncating the consideration 
of proposals and for "hiding" amendments to different pieces of 
legislation. 114 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bills in particular 
have in the past included large numbers of sometimes substantive 
miscellaneous and unconnected reforms.115 
The Review Committee took the view that as a matter of principle each 
Bill introduced into the House should relate to one subject only unless the 
111 Standing Orders of the New Zealand House of Representatives, (NZ House of Representatives, 
Wellington, 1996) SO 57. 
112 See above m A 1. 
113 See n1, p 49. 
ll4See n2; and see above I11 A 4. 
ll5see n2. 
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Bill fitting into one of a limited number of specific categories of Omnibus 
Bills which the new standing orders would permit.116 The revised standing 
orders codified the acceptable practices with regard to omnibus legislation. 
The different types of Omnibus Bill which are recognised and regulated by 
the standing orders include Law Reform Bills and Statutes Amendment 
Bills. The requirement that Statutes Reform Bills include only amendments 
which have the support of all members of the House is actually stated in 
the standing orders for the first time.117 The use of Law Reform or other 
Omnibus Bills is severely restricted. Under the new orders Law Reform or 
other Omnibus Bills may amend more than one Act where those Acts deal 
with an inter-related topic so that the amendment can be regarded as 
implementing a single broad policy or alternatively where the amendments 
being effected to the different Acts are of a similar nature. 118 
These new rules for Omnibus Bills are quite strict and should stop the 
inappropriate use of Law Reform bills by government. The Speaker has 
been given the role of scrutinising each Bill on its introduction for 
compliance with the new requirements . Any Bill that does not comply is to 
be either ruled out of order or printed with such amendments as the 
Speaker directs. 11 9 It should be noted however that the rules relating to 
Omnibus Bills can be waved by the Business Committee if it agrees to the 
introduction of a particular Bill which does not comply with the rules. 
116See nl, p49. 
117See n1, p50. 
118see nl, p49. 
119 See nl, p50. 
45 
8 Bill of Rights Act compliance 
The Review Committee took the view that incorporation of the procedure 
for compliance with section 7 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 should be 
made more specific than it had been under previous standing orders. 
Section 7 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 requires the Attorney General to 
bring to the attention of the House any provision in a Bill which appears 
to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in that 
Act. In the case of a government Bill this obligation was normally 
complied with on introduction and in the case of a Members Bill it was 
complied with as soon as practical after introduction. 120 
Under the new standing orders the Attorney General's report, including 
the reasons behind the certification, will be tabled in the House before a 
Bill's second reading. 121 The tabling of a written report complete with 
reasons will obviously enhance the transparency of the process. It will lead 
to better scrutiny on the issue of whether or not a Bill complys with the 
Bill Of Rights Act 1990. 
A serious omission which has not been addressed by the new standing 
orders is the assessment of whether amendments, which are made to a Bill 
following the second reading, comply with the Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
Where a Bill is substantially amended at select committee the Attorney 
General's report may no longer address the necessary issues. There is no 
mechanism within the standing orders for obtaining an updated report 
during the later stages of the legislative process. The standing orders do 
not for example allow select committees to refer a matter back to the 
Attorney General for consideration. Select committees, as shall be 
discussed later, may be in a position to obtain their own verification on the 
120 See nl, p51. 
121 See n 111, SO 258. 
implications amendments pose for the Bill of Rights Act but they are not 
required to do so. 
B Increased Flexibility 
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The new standing orders introduce a greater degree of flexibility into the 
legislative process through the creation of the Business Committee. The 
Business Committee, which is in effect the House's executive, has 
responsibility for directing the flow of work through the House. The Prime 
Minister the Hon Jim Bolger said during the debate on the Review 
Committee's report that the Business Committee is designed to find broad 
agreement amongst political parties for the workload of Parliament in the 
week ahead. 122 
Under the standing orders the Business Committee has scope to vary the 
standard process prescribed by the standing orders to match any piece of 
legislation under consideration. Flexibility within the legislative process is 
enhanced by the Business Committees ability to alter the legislative 
process. As will become apparent from the following discussion the 
increased flexibility the Business Committee will provide will arguably 
work to reduce transparency within the legislative process. 
1 Fast tracking legislation 
With the agreement of the Business Committee a Bill may be introduced 
during a time when the House is in adjournment. The Bill is deemed read 
on the day on which the Business Committee agrees to its introduction. 
The Bill then stands referred to the select committee nominated by the 
Business Committee. This means that the Bill will go to select committee 
122 (1995)54 NZPD 10787. 
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without having had a second reading or any debate on its principles. In 
such cases the Bill will receive its second reading after the debate on the 
select committee's report. It was envisaged by the Review Committee that 
this process would be most relevant for non contentious Bills. 123 
Where Bills are introduced during an adjournment and go straight to select 
committee before their second reading the Business Committee can agree 
that debate on their second reading is not required. The second reading is 
then put without debate. This means that the first opportunity for debate 
on such Bills will be the debate on the select committee's report. Again this 
fast track procedure appears to be designed for non contentious legislation. 
The Business Committee can also agree to omit the Committee of the 
whole House stage for any Bill including one introduced during an 
adjournment. Where it decides to do so the Bill can then go directly from 
the debate on the select committee's report to the third reading. In practice 
the combined impact of all three of these fast tracking procedures could 
result in a Bill first being debated by the House at the third reading. A 
nominated select committee would still consider the Bill and the House 
would still debate the select committee's report on the Bill . 
It should be noted that the new rules do not specifically restrict the 
availability of these fast tracking mechanisms to non contentious Bills. It 
would seem unlikely though that the Business Committee would readily 
reach agreement to fast track a contentious Bill. The ability to fast track, 
even non contentious legislation, could impede transparency. As discussed 
above transparency within the legislative process requires the opportunity 
for informed debate and participation in law making.1u It is uncertain 
whether this will occur when Bills are fast tracked through the process by 
123 See nl, p54. 
124 See above V A. 
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the Business Committee. 
In any event there are obviously risks in terms of scrutiny and quality 
control in permitting the Business Committee to fast track legislation even 
where the procedure is only utilised in relation to non contentious Bills. 
Scrutiny and quality control are still important in relation to non 
contentious legislation. It should not be assumed that non contentious 
legislation will be better drafted or less technically complex. As has been 
discussed earlier in the paper, all the stages of the legislative process 
contribute something towards the scrutiny and quality control of each Bill, 
even though the select committee stage, which cannot be omitted, is clearly 
the most important.125 
2 Modifying time frames 
The Business Committee has the power to alter the notice period for 
debates and the length of debates. The Review Committee took the view 
that the times for debates set out in the standing orders were essentially a 
fall back position for situations where the Business Committee could not 
agree to an appropriate time frame. 126 A major role of the Business 
Committee is to determine equitable arrangements for debates. The fall 
back position under the standing orders for debates is very short. The 
second reading for example, which is the main debate on any Bill, is set at 
a two hour maximum. If the Business Committee is unable to reach 
agreement on an extended period then two hours would be quite 
insufficient for the major debate on a contentious piece of legislation. 
The ability to vary the legislative process through the Business Committee 
provides considerable flexibility where there is cooperation between the 
125 See above III A 2. 
126 See n1, p20. 
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political parties in the House. Such flexibility however is dependant on the 
success of the Business Committee. If the Business Committee is able to 
operate effectively and remain focused on facilitating the business of the 
House, rather than political disagreements, there is potential within the 
new standing orders to shape the legislative process to the needs of the 
legislation under consideration. This may reduce the time and quantity 
pressures on the legislative programme. However such flexibility poses 
risks in terms of the transparency of the process and the opportunities for 
scrutiny and quality control. 
C Introducing Proportionality 
The new standing orders are designed to bring the procedures used in the 
House into line with the reality of a multi-party Parliament. The new rules 
provide for participation proportionate to party representation within the 
House. This move to proportionality is likely to result in a substantial 
reduction in executive control of the legislative process. Previous standing 
orders had not recognised individual political parties. Instead the House 
had been divided into the Government and the Opposition and procedural 
rights within the House were distributed on that basis. The Review 
Committee saw this as something which needed to change with the 
adoption of MMP. 
1 Operation of the House 
The new standing orders include for the first time specific recognition of 
parties. Under the standing orders a party will be recognised once it's 
leadership has informed the Speaker of the party's existence, its name and 
parliamentary membership. The Speaker must also be informed of any 
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coalitions which may be formed within the House.127 Any changes in any 
of these matters must also be reported to the Speaker. The recognition of 
parties signals a significant move away from the old formation of the 
Government and the Opposition. Recognition is particularly significant for 
the allocation of speaking rights during debates and to the composition of 
the new Business Committee, which will be discussed later in the paper. 
The Office of the Leader of the Opposition continues to be recognised 
under the new standing orders although the functions of that office have 
become more limited than under the previous standing orders. 128 
The voting system which was put in place by the new standing orders also 
specifically recognises political parties. Modelled on the system that is 
used in the Netherlands, the standing orders provide for a new three 
tiered voting system. Questions are initially decided on a voice vote. When 
a party wishes to record its dissention or when there is some doubt about 
the numbers for or against on a voice vote, any MP may call for a party 
vote. Under a party vote a representative of each party states the direction 
and the number of votes the party is casting. Independent members and 
MPs not voting with their party, if there are any, do the same.129 The third 
tier, which is a personal vote, is only available were the issue is so close 
that it could make a difference, or where the issue is a conscience matter. 
Combined with the introduction of party voting are new rules on proxy 
voting and new quorum requirements. The quorum requirement for the 
House has been abolished . Proxy voting has been introduced to replace the 
pairing system. The Review Committee for obvious reasons took the view 
that the pairing system could not work effectively with a greater number 
of parties in Parliament. The system of proxy voting is designed to allow 
127 See n111 , SO 34. 
128 See n1, p17. 
129 See n1, p28. 
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some flexibility for MPs to be absent from the House. 
Under the new standing orders as adopted by the House on 19 December 
1995 Members are required to give proper written authority for a proxy 
vote stating who is able to exercise the proxy. A member not wishing to 
vote with their party can give a proxy to another party. The rules permit 
any party to exercise proxy votes for up to 25% of its members at any one 
time. Explaining the rationale of the proxy voting system the Hon Wyatt 
Creech said in the debate on the Review Committee report that: "the proxy 
system offers a Parliament that will be able to hold the position in terms of 
strength of members of parties that the public established at the previous 
proportional representation election." 130 
However significant concern has been expressed suggesting that the rules 
on proxy votes are too lenient because they allow MPs to be absent from 
Parliament too often. David Lange said that in his view the new voting 
system works to the "awful detriment" of the House. He said: "I haven't 
voted this year. I could be in Brazil and be an MP. In fact under this new 
system I think some MPs probably will live in Brazil". J3l Further criticism 
has been directed at the combination of the party and proxy vote. 
Margaret Austin during the debate on the new standing orders claimed 
that the new system essentially disenfranchised individual MPs in favour 
of their parties. She claimed that:" what we will get now is not the vote of 
a representative at all; it will be the vote of a party ... the whip has the right 
to cast a vote on behalf of the party." 132 
Her criticism, although perhaps overstated in relation to the system 
130 (1995)54 NZPD 10811. 
131 "The Warrior of Mangere plots fight to normality", The Dominion, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 6 June 1996, p5 .. 
132 (1995)54 NZPD 10810. 
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contained in the standing orders, is certainly justified in regard to the 
proxy voting system which was implemented by sessional order on 21 
February 1996. That order states that: "the leader or senior whip of each 
party ... may exercise a proxy vote for each member of the party, subject to 
any express direct from a member to the contrary." 133 
Under the sessional order the whip and not the representative does appear 
to have the right to cast the vote. The leader of the party is assumed to 
have a proxy for each member of their party as and when required. It is 
up to the member to take back the vote to either exercise it directly in the 
House or give a proxy to another party. On 22 August 1996 the standing 
orders were amended so that the wording of the sessional order. This 
change was among those recommended by the Review Committee in their 
brief follow up report. 13.i 
2 11ze role of the Business Committee 
The establishment of the Business Committee, its composition and role 
strongly reflects the principle of proportionality. The rules setting up and 
governing the functioning of the Committee allow for representation and 
influence proportional to membership of the House. Most parties will be 
represented on the Committee and through that representation will have 
some say in the administration and operation of Parliament. As was 
outlined earlier in the paper the Business Committee is designed to 
function as the executive of the House. The standing orders provide that 
the Committee may determine the order of business to be transacted in the 
House and the time spent on each item. 
133 Sessional Order of New Zealand House of Representatives, Adopted 21 February 1996, (1996) 
55 NZPD 10978. 
134 See n99, p7. 
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The Business Committee can determine the allocation of speaking time 
among the parties represented in the House and even the speaking times 
of individual members on any particular item.135 The Business Committee 
may also decide whether a Bill is to be debated part by part rather than 
clause by clause. Business Committee determinations have the effect of 
overriding any standing order to the contrary.136 The provisions in the 
standing orders which determine the order of business in the House and 
the time frame and rules of debate on any matter are essentially a fall back 
position which can be overridden or modified through agreement at the 
Business Committee. 
This represents quite a significant shift in the relationship between the 
House and the government. In the past the government through the 
Leader of the House determined, within the limits set by the standing 
orders, the order in which the House dealt with business. The Business 
Committee has taken over this role and has the power to prescribe the 
order of business. In order for the Business Committee to effectively 
exercise this role, it must be able to reach agreement and make decisions. 
If it fails to reach agreement then the government regains the ability, 
within the confines set by the standing orders, to set the agenda of the 
House. The extent to which the Business Committee will take over this 
function will depend on the ability of the parties to work cooperatively 
through the Business Committee. 
3 Membership of the Business Committee 
The members of the Committee will represent all parties represented in the 
House. Each party with six or more MPs in the House is entitled to have 
their own member on the Business Committee. Parties with less than six 
135 See nl 11, S078. 
136 See nl 11, S079. 
MPs who are part of the government coalition will also be jointly 
represented by one member chosen by the group. Similarly those parties 
with under six MPs who form part of the Opposition will be represented 
by an MP chosen by that group. The size of the Business Committee will 
therefore depend slightly on the composition of the House. 
Decisions of the Business Committee are reached on the basis of 
unanimity, but where this is not possible near unanimity based on the 
number of MPs each member of the Business Committee represents will 
suffice. Near unanimity means the agreement of the overwhelming 
majority of MPs. The Speaker, who chairs the Business Committee, 
determines whether or not there is near unanimity on any matter before 
the Business Committee. 
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Since the new standing orders were adopted on 20 February 1996 a 
"pseudo" Business Committee has been operating. Membership of this 
"pseudo" Business Committee has recognised the transition between an 
FPP Parliament and an MMP Parliament and does not strictly comply with 
the rules determining proportional membership of the Business 
Committee. Each of the following parties have one representative on the 
Committee: National, Labour, United, New Zealand First and the Alliance. 
There is also one representative for the two single member parties, (the 
Christian Democrats and the Conservatives), and the independent member, 
all of whom are essentially on the Government side. 137 To date this trial 
Business Committee has taken its role on rather tentatively. It has acted 
mainly to prescribe the order of business in the House and has set debate 
times which differ very little from those prescribed in the standing orders. 
The Committee has also generally followed the recommendations of the 
137 Minutes of the Meeting of the Parties to discuss the establishment of a 
Business Committee, dated 14 February 1996. 
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government.138 
The tentativeness and caution with which the Committee is currently 
approaching its role is probably a reflection of the ambiguity in its current 
composition and the respective voting strength of each member. 
Committee decisions are currently being taken without a vote also 
probably for this reason. It is therefore difficult to predict at this stage how 
effectively the Business Committee will operate within an MMP Parliament 
when its membership truly reflect proportionality within the House. 
One thing which is clear is that the Business Committee will essentially be 
a party machine which represents party points of view on the issues which 
come before it. The fact that all parties are not directly represented on the 
Business Committee is therefore difficult to reconcile with the Committee's 
function. Small parties and independent MPs, with potentially conflicting 
policy and ideology, will under the membership rules be represented 
through the same member.139 In view of the proportional voice which each 
member of the Committee has and the five percent electoral threshold 
which applies under MMP, there appears to be no real justification for not 
allowing all parties separate representation on the Business Committee. 
This issue is potentially quite significant given the power which the 
Business Committee has over the passage of legislation through the House. 
4 Select committee membership 
New rules on select committees will come into force following the first 
MMP election on 12 October 1996.Ho Allocation of membership of select 
committees presents a further area where the standing orders now reflect 
138 This is clearly demonstrated in the minutes of the Business Committee as at May 1996. 
139 Opposition parties in particular may have quite dissimilar ideologies and policy. 
140 See (1995)54 NZPD 10811 . 
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proportionality. Standing Order 189(2) provides that "the overall 
membership of select committees must, so far as reasonably practicable, be 
proportional to party membership of the House".141 The government may 
not as a result have a majority on every committee or indeed on any 
particular committee. The chairperson of each select committee will not 
necessarily be drawn from the same party as the government. Where the 
government does not have control of a select committee, either through the 
chair or through a majority, the select committee will be free to take a 
more independent position when examining legislation. 
The overall membership of select committees will increase under the new 
standing orders to eight members. With the increase in MP numbers from 
98 to approximately 120, most MPs will probably only be on one 
committee. MPs from smaller parties may still need to cover more 
committees, even if not actually members of them. This change should 
reduce the workload of MPs and as a consequence reduce substitution and 
increase the level of specialist knowledge on each committee. All of these 
changes will improve the scrutiny of legislation. 
Following the substantial revision of the select committee system which 
took place in 1985, select committee powers were considerably extended. 
The extension of select committee powers was seen as the most effective 
way to increase the accountability of the government and its officials to the 
Parliament. 142 Some commentators have expressed the view that select 
committees are not yet fully utilising their enhanced powers.143 It may well 
be that with increased independence from government select committees 
will begin to explore the extent of their powers and potential influence 
141 See n 111, S0189(2). 
14~he Royal Commission on Electoral Reform took this view. 
See Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a 
Better Democracy, Wellington, 1986. 
143see n23. 
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more zealously. 
The new rules provide for the inclusion of minority views within the 
narrative of select committee reports.144 It is expected that there could be 
greater desire in an MMP parliament for dissenting views to be known.145 
This change increases the relevance of minority views on select committees 
and by doing so encourage participation by members from minority 
parties whose views are less likely to prevail. Reports must also 
distinguish amendments that are unanimous from those that have majority 
support. Amendments which have majority support are now voted on 
separately during the committee's report back. This change seem 
specifically to recognise that the majority view of the select committee may 
not reflect the view of the majority in the House. 
The Review Committee anticipated that ministers in charge of Bills may 
wish to attend and participate in select committee more when their Bills 
are under consideration. 146 Such a change reflects the probability that select 
committees will increasingly be the place where legislation is developed 
and its contents determined. Ministers or other proponents of Bills may 
well use select committees as the forum for negotiating support for the 
detail of their Bill, particularly when the chair of the select committee is 
not a member of the government party. 
The Review Committee recognised that select committees will require an 
enhanced level of independent advice to assist them in both their scrutiny 
and legislative functions . The Review Committee recommended that the 
Clerk of the House prepare an analysis of the services required by select 
committees and the resources and cost implications of these services for 
144 See n111, 50246. 
145 See nl, p59. 
146 See nl, p59. 
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consideration as part of the budget process. 147 
In terms of advice on legislation the Review Committee confirmed that a 
select committee's first source of advice on policy in a government Bill and 
the application of the proposed law should still be the minister and 
his/ her departmental officials. 148 However, recognising their potential 
independence and enhanced role in legislative scrutiny, a select committee 
may wish to contest the governmental advice and may want access to 
independent sources of policy and legal advice on matters such as: 
• implications of the Treaty of Waitangi; 
• consistency with the rights and freedoms contained in Bill of 
Rights Act 1990; 
• consistency with the general principles of administrative and 
constitutional law; 
• the application of international law; and 
• the drafting of amendments. 
The Review Committee envisaged that the need for contesting government 
advice could be addressed through the purchase of external services for 
select committees. However the need for more general legal advice and for 
drafting assistance should be catered for through the development of an 
in-house legal resource within the Office of the Clerk of the House. The 
report stated that: "an in house resource will allow all legislation to receive 
147 See n1, p45. 
148 See n1, p46. 
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a constant level of scrutiny". 149 
The Review Committee essentially reached the conclusion in its report that 
Parliament requires its own source of legal advice and drafting to function 
well under MMP. The Committee recommended that this should be 
provided through the office of the Clerk of the House. This strong call for 
additional resources and an improved advice capacity indicates that select 
committees will become more confidence and independent in the future 
and will wish to undertake their own analysis and pursue their own policy 
agendas in a way that they have not done to date. Providing services of 
these kinds would directly address some of the issues of quality at the 
select committee stage which were raised earlier in this paper.150 The issue 
of access to expert legal advice and drafting services in relation to 
members Bills is discussed further next. 
5 Members Bills 
The new standing orders enhance the rights of members to introduce 
legislation. Under the new standing orders members may initiate proposals 
for the first time which involve taxation and expenditure. Under the 
financial veto procedures set out in the standing orders the government of 
the day has an absolute right to veto any legislative proposal involving 
taxation or expenditure put forward by a private member if the 
government considers that the proposal would have more than a minor 
impact on any of the Crown's key fiscal aggregates. 151 
The financial veto provisions replaced the appropriation rule which was 
149 See nl , p46. 
150 See above Ill B 2. 
151 See nl, p61. Note that the standing orders do not deal with the question of what level 
of expenditure may or may meet the definition of being of "more than minor impact" . 
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contained in the previous standing orders. Under the appropriation rule all 
non-government Bills or amendments involving increases in expenditure 
or taxation were ruled out of order and prohibited by the standing orders 
unless supported by the government and by a recommendation from the 
Crown. Under the previous standing orders private members Bills 
involving appropriations or imposing taxation were simply not set down 
for a second reading. 152 The appropriation rule was a very effective barrier 
which a government could utilise to prevent the advancement of a great 
number of private members Bills not to mention amendments. 
The new standing orders concerning balloting and the introduction and 
first reading of members Bills reduce the restrictions on the number of 
such Bills which can be introduced and read a first time.153 Excluding the 
ballot requirements, the distinction between members and government 
Bills has essentially been dropped. All members Bills will now get through 
a first reading and will therefore be published and circulated . As a result 
they are likely to attract more public attention. Whether or not they 
proceed any further though will depend primarily on the support of the 
Business Committee. 
It is likely given these rule changes that members Bills will continue to 
grow in number and importance. The Review Committee described 
members Bills since 1994 as a growth industry . 154 An increase in members 
Bills will have considerable implications for the quality and consistency of 
legislation. The Review Committee, concerned to ensure a consistent and 
high standard in drafting of legislation that adhered to the rules and 
guidelines established by law reform bodies, recognised the need to 
152 See n 28, SO 218. 
153 See n91, p138. 
154see n1, p59. 
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provide specialist legal drafting services for drafting members Bills. 155 The 
Review Committee discussed a number of options in its report but did not 
reach any clear conclusions or put forward a firm proposal for the future 
of legislative drafting services. 
The Review Committee may have felt that it was premature to take up a 
position during the current transition phase. Instead it recommended that 
Parliament further examine the issue of whether or not it should have its 
own drafting and legal advice service which would be able to draft 
members Bills and amendments and give independent contestable advice 
on government legislation. Until this issue is taken further and resolved 
members Bills will continue to be of varying quality, drafted in an ad hoe 
fashion, using whatever resources and assistance MPs are able to obtain. 
Unless some consistency and quality assurance is introduced into this area, 
the growth of members Bills could represent a significant risk to the 
technical quality of legislation. 
155 See n1, p59. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
Until recently the government effectively controlled both the legislative 
and executive branches of government. Once decisions were made by 
Cabinet, the convention of collective ministerial responsibility and the strict 
whipping system ensured that those decisions were accepted by the 
governing party's parliamentary caucus and pushed by the caucus through 
the Parliament. A government could therefore be confident that the 
substantial policy content of any Bill which it put forward would not be 
changed without the government's agreement. 
The executive's domination over the House meant that legislation was a 
function of the executive rather than the Parliament. The balance of power 
between the executive and the Parliament raised doubts about the 
effectiveness of scrutiny within the legislative process. The various stages 
of the legislative process are designed to ensure that legislation is properly 
considered before it is enacted . The legislative process contained 
insufficient procedural safeguards which allowed the executive to 
completely dominate the House and its committees. This compromised the 
opportunity for effective scrutiny of legislation. 
The legislative process should also operate to ensure that legislation is of a 
consistantly high quality before it is enacted . A key purpose of legislative 
scrutiny is ensuring that legislation is effective and technically sound and 
will fit harmoniously into the fabric of existing law. 
MMP and the new standing orders have introduced significant changes 
into the legislative process. These changes reflect a move to proportionality 
and a consequential reduction in government control over the House and 
its legislative function . The changes also have a considerable impact on the 
scrutiny and quality of legislation within the legislative process. 
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A Government Control 
MMP will change the balance of power between the executive and the 
Parliament and this will alter the way that the legislative process will 
operate. MMP will produce a more diverse range of election outcomes 
than the previous system. In particular MMP will sometimes result in a 
minority government or an unstable or diverse coalition government 
which will not command a secure majority within the House on all policy 
issues. Such a government will not exercise the degree of control over the 
legislative process which New Zealand governments have in the past. 
There will be a shift in power from the executive to the legislature. The 
government will not have full control over Parliament's legislative 
programme. 
Initiating legislation will still principally be the role of the government. 
Although the relative strength of the government of the day in terms of 
support within the House will significantly influence the type and amount 
of legislation which it will put forward. Where the government is not 
reasonably confident of support less legislation will be put forward and its 
passage through the House will be more problematic. The opportunities 
for changing the substantive policy content of legislation during its 
passage through the House will be considerably enhanced. As a result the 
legislative process will be protracted and the outcome less certain. 
The new standing orders bring the workings of the House and its 
committees into line with the reality of this shift in power away from the 
government. The new rules enhance transparency in most areas of the 
legislative process which reduces the opportunities for executive 
manipulation and control of the process. Although it should be noted that 
the Business Committee's ability to fast track legislation may well work to 
impede transparency in some areas. The imposition of notice periods for 
debates, the changes to urgency, the restrictions on Omnibus Bills and the 
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tentative attempts to curb the misuse of SOPs are all changes which are 
designed to reduce the executive's ability to take the House by stealth and 
push through Bills without proper scrutiny. 
The new standing orders provide for participation proportionate to party 
representation. This will result in a substantial reduction in executive 
control of the legislative process. Speaking rights within the House are 
distributed on the basis of the strength of party representation. The new 
proxy voting system and quorum requirements maintain proportionality. 
The Business Committee, which has been set up to function as the House's 
executive, represents a significant shift in the relationship between the 
House and the government. The Business Committee has taken over much 
of the role of the Leader of the House. 
Private members also have enhanced rights over the introduction of 
legislation. Members Bills can now legitimately incorporate a far wider 
range of proposals. The shift in power away from the government and the 
reduction in the government's legislative programme will greatly improve 
the prospect of enactment for members Bills. This increase in members 
Bills will further loosen the government's control over the legislative 
programme. 
Select committee membership has also been significantly altered in a way 
which will change the relationship between select committees and the 
executive. As a result select committees are likely to be more independent 
from the government than has previously been the case. They will be more 
confident in their approach to modifying legislation. Ministers and other 
proponents of Bills may well be required to attend select committee and 
use it as a forum for negotiating support for the detail of their Bill. The 
strong call for additional resources and an improved independent advice 
facility for select committees indicates that select committees will become 
more confident and independent. Select committees will in future 
undertake their own analysis and pursue their own policy agendas in a 
way that they have not done to date 
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The impact of MMP on the New Zealand system of government could 
therefore be quite profound. The government may not always have control 
over the content or passage of legislation as it passes through the House. 
Where the government does not command a secure majority within the 
House the content of legislation will be determined by the House 
operating particularly through select committees, rather than by the 
government. Legislation as a result will again become truly the function of 
the Parliament which will determine its substantive content and not just 
endorse and legitimise it. 
B Scrutiny and Quality Control 
The consequences in terms of the scrutiny and quality of legislation are 
somewhat mixed. The new standing orders have enhanced the procedural 
safeguards and thereby increased the opportunity for appropriate and full 
scrutiny of legislation by select committee and the House. This should 
generally result in Bills being more fully considered before they become 
law. Although the Business Committee's ability to fast track legislation 
may work against adequate scrutiny in some cases. 
The new standing orders incorporate a number of additional procedural 
safeguards which should generally work to enhance the degree of scrutiny 
which legislation is subjected to within the legislative process. In particular 
the inclusion of policy statements, the changes to the legislative sequence 
and time frames, the introduction of requirements for notice of debate and 
the imposition of stricter rules on Omnibus Bills and urgency should all 
operate to improve the scrutiny and quality of legislation. These changes 
address many of the issues which have been identified by commentators 
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as barriers to effective scrutiny. 
There are obvious risks in terms of scrutiny and quality control in 
permitting the Business Committee to fast track even non contentious 
legislation. It should not be assumed that non contentious legislation will 
be any better drafted or less technically complex than other legislation. All 
stages of the legislative process contribute towards the scrutiny and quality 
control of each Bill, although select committee scrutiny, which has been 
enhanced under the new standing orders, is clearly the most important. 
The legislative process itself will however become more protracted and 
less certain under MMP. There will be more opportunity for amendment 
and modification to Bills during the process. Members Bills will also 
increase in number and could become a more significant source of law. 
Where the substantive content of legislation is relatively fluid during the 
legislative process legislation is less likely to be coherent and of a 
consistently high quality. It may be therefore that improvements in quality, 
which could be expected as the result of increased scrutiny and enhanced 
procedural safeguards under the new standing orders, will be offset by the 
increased uncertainty which will surround the content of legislation during 
its passage through the House. It is therefore extremely difficult to predict 
whether the overall result will be an improvement in the quality and 
coherence of legislation. 
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